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Abstract—Due to the broadcast nature of wireless medium,
wireless communication is highly vulnerable to eavesdropping
attack. Traditionally, secure wireless data transmission has re-
lied on cryptographic techniques at the network layer which
incur high computational power and complexity. As an alterna-
tive, physical layer security (PLS) is emerging as a promising
paradigm to protect wireless systems by exploiting the physical
characteristics of the wireless channels. Among various PLS
approaches, the one based on cooperative communication is
favorable and has got a lot of interest from the research commu-
nity. Although PLS schemes with half-duplex relays have been
extensively discovered, the issue of PLS in cooperative systems
with full-duplex (FD) relays is far from being comprehensively
understood. In this paper, we first present the state of the art on
PLS approaches proposed for FD cooperative systems. We then
provide a case study in which a source-based jamming scheme
is proposed to enhance the secrecy performance of a cooperative
system with an untrusted FD relay. Finally, we outline several
interesting yet challenging future research problems in this topic.
I. INTRODUCTION
Owning to the recent evolution of wireless communica-
tions and the popularity of hand-held devices such as smart
phones and tablets, more and more people are using wireless
networks for e-banking, personal emails, e-health, and file
sharing. However, due to the broadcast nature of wireless
medium, confidential information can be easily overheard
by adversaries. It has recently reported that an increasing
number of wireless devices are abused for malicious attacks,
data forging, financial information theft, online bullying, and
so on [1]. Therefore, ensuring secrecy and privacy are of
utmost concern for future wireless communication systems.
Traditionally, secure wireless data transmission has been relied
on the cryptographic technique at the network layer which
incurs a very high computational power and complexity. As
an alternative, physical layer security (PLS), or information-
theoretic security, is emerging as a promising paradigm to
realize secure communication against eavesdropping attacks
by exploiting the characteristics of wireless channels [2]. The
advantages of PLS lie behind the fact that it is simple, it does
not require any assumption at adversaries, and it can be used
to augment existing cryptographic schemes, i.e. physical layer
noise was reported to considerably improve the performance
of cryptographic schemes in [3] and references therein.
On the other hand, cooperative communication has been
proven to be a powerful method to increase the throughput
and coverage of single-antenna systems [4]. In a cooperative
system, single or multiple neighbor nodes of a source, called
relays, help the source to forward manipulated versions of the
source signal to a destination. The way a relay manipulates the
source signal depends on which relaying protocol is deployed.
Among various relaying protocols, the most popular are
amplify-and-forward (AnF) and decode-and-forward (DnF).
An AnF relay simply amplifies its received signal and forwards
the outcome to the destination. In addition, a DnF relay first
decodes its received signal, re-encodes, and then forwards
the result to the destination. Besides relaying protocols, the
operation of a relay also depends on relaying modes which
include half-duplex (HD) and full-duplex (FD) modes. In the
HD mode, relays receive and forward the source signal in
different time slots. On the contrary, in the FD mode, relays
can receive and transmit simultaneously. As a result, systems
with FD relays, referred to as FD systems, have a better
spectral efficiency than that given by the HD counterparts.
The FD mode was considered impractical in the past since
the performance of FD systems is limited by the loop inter-
ference (LI) between a relay input and output. Recently, with
advances on antenna design and signal processing the LI can
be significantly canceled, and thus, the FD mode has got a lot
of attention from research community [5].
It is shown in [6] that cooperative communication also
provides a great potential to secure wireless data transmissions,
which provokes a significant research interest in the topic
of designing PLS schemes based on cooperative nodes, i.e.
[1]-[2] and references therein. PLS for cooperative systems
can be categorized as secret key-based and keyless schemes,
among which keyless PLS (K-PLS) schemes have been largely
considered because they do not require secret keys for en-
cryption/decryption data [1]. Keyless PLS schemes for HD
systems have been extensively investigated in [7], [8], and
references therein. It has been shown that when relays are
trusted, they can be exploited to enhance the systems se-
crecy performance by using the relaying, jamming, and the
hybrid relaying and jamming approaches. In addition, even
when relays are untrustworthy, it is still possible to obtain
secure communication by applying the destination-based or
the source-destination-based jamming schemes. Although K-
PLS schemes for HD systems are well explored, research
works on FD systems are limited [9]-[14]. It means that
designing and analyzing K-PLS schemes for FD systems are
only at their early stages, and the opportunity for innovation
remains tremendous. This observation motivates us to present
a review on the current state of the art in this line of research
and discuss possible future research directions. Note that we
only focus on the PLS of FD cooperative systems rather
than providing a comprehensive survey in the whole field of
cooperative PLS.
2II. FUNDAMENTALS OF PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY IN
COOPERATIVE SYSTEMS
Before going into details about our main focus, we first
quickly present the fundamental concepts of PLS to make our
paper easy to follow by general readers. The basic principle of
PLS is to exploit the physical characteristics of the wireless
medium, i.e. fading, noise, and interferences, so as to limit
the amount of information that can be extracted at the bit
level by eavesdroppers. The main advantages of PLS come
from the facts that no computational restrictions are placed on
the eavesdroppers, PLS can operate independently of higher
layers, and that very precise statements can be made about the
information that is leaked to the eavesdroppers as a function
of the channel quality [2]. Apparently, the aforementioned
advantages of PLS is only half of the story. We should
also note that PLS relies on average information measures.
A system can be designed for a specific level of security,
claiming for instance that a block will be secure with a very
high probability; however, it might not be possible to guarantee
confidentiality with probability one.
The research on PLS was initiated by Wyner in [15] where a
three-node configuration including a source, a destination, and
an eavesdropper (as shown in the Fig. 1) was considered. It
was shown that secure data transmission can be achieved from
an information theoretic perspective if the source-eavesdropper
channel, referred to as the wiretap channel, is a degraded
version of the legitimate source-destination channel. In other
words, the system can realize secure communication if its
secrecy capacity (SC), which is defined as the difference be-
tween the capacity obtained at the legitimate receiver and that
obtained at the eavesdropper, is positive. The SC represents
the maximum transmission rate at which the source can com-
municate with the destination without the eavesdropper being
able to acquire any confidential information. If the destination
imposes a target secrecy rate higher than the SC, a secrecy
outage event will occur. In addition, the average probability
of this event is called secrecy outage probability (SOP), which
is considered as the most general secrecy performance measure
of a system under PLS constraint.
After Wyner’s seminal work, considerable research efforts
have been devoted to develop various PLS techniques which
can be generally classified into artificial-noise aided, multi-
antenna diversity, cooperative diversity, secret key generation,
and coding [1]-[2], among which the one based on cooperative
communication is of our special interest. PLS for cooperative
systems can be further categorized as secret key-based and
keyless schemes [1]. In a key-based scheme, a source and a
destination first transmit known signals to each other via a
relay. The two nodes then estimate a virtual channel between
them from the received signals. Thereafter, several necessary
processes are carried out to make sure that keys generated
from the virtual channel on both sides are the same. Finally,
this key is used to encrypt and decrypt confidential messages.
Although a relay can be used to improve the key generation
rate, it can be compromised and become a malicious user.
Consequently, secret information can be easily intercepted
and revealed, which may be the main reason why research
Fig. 1. Wyner’s wiretap channel model.
works on key-based PLS schemes for cooperative systems
are very limited [1]. On the other hand, K-PLS schemes,
which do not require secret keys for encryption/decryption
data but employ signal processing and diversity techniques
to obtain secure transmissions, have got a lot of interest from
research community. The ultimate goal of a K-PLS scheme is
to improve the SC of a considered system either by enhancing
the capacity obtained at the receiver or by degrading the
capacity achieved at the eavesdropper.
III. KEYLESS PLS SCHEMES FOR FD SYSTEMS WITH
TRUSTED RELAYS
Although FD relays have been largely considered for con-
ventional cooperative systems (systems without an eavesdrop-
per), analyzing the capability of FD relays for the security
purpose has only carried out recently in [9]. K-PLS schemes
for FD systems can be categorized into different groups based
upon the role of relays. Particularly, we have relaying group,
in which relay(s) only play(s) the role of pure (actual) relay(s),
and relaying and jamming group, in which relay(s) play(s) the
role of both actual relay(s) and friendly jammer(s). In addition,
in the former group, schemes with a single relay consist of
FD relaying (FDR) and hybrid HD-FD relaying (H-HD-FDR),
while schemes with multiple relays include beamforming and
relay selection (RS). Moreover, the latter group contains the
FD jamming (FDJ) scheme with one relay and the hybrid
beamforming scheme with multiple relays. A summary of K-
PLS schemes for FD systems is given in the Table I, shown
at the top of the next page.
A. Relaying Schemes
When only one relay is available, the relay can be op-
erated following the FDR or the H-HD-FDR schemes [9]-
[11]. In the FDR scheme, the relay simply operates in the
FD mode, i.e. simultaneously receiving and forwarding the
source messages. Although an eavesdropper can receive the
signals coming from the source and the relay at the same
time, the relay transmission signal is a delayed version of
the source transmission signal. Consequently, the concurrent
transmissions of the source and the relay cause inter-symbol
interference at the eavesdropper, from which the achievable
3TABLE I
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capacity obtained at the eavesdropper is degraded. It is shown
in [9] that when the LI between the relay input and output
is sufficiently canceled, which is feasible nowadays thanks to
advances in antenna design and signal processing, the FDR
scheme can provide a much lower SOP than that given by the
HD relaying (HDR) counterpart. However, when the residual
LI (after LI cancellation) is strong, the converse holds. It
means that between the HD and the FD mode, one of them
can be superior to the other depending upon the level of
the residual LI. Motivated by this observation, the authors
of [10] propose the H-HD-FDR scheme, in which the relay
switches between the two modes to achieve the best secrecy
performance. More specifically, if the system SC obtained by
the HD mode is larger than that given by the FD mode, the
relay will operate following the HD fashion, otherwise; the FD
mode will be employed. It is shown that the hybrid scheme
provides a good secrecy performance compared to that of the
FDR and the HDR schemes. The secrecy performance of the
H-HD-FDR scheme can be further boosted by employing a
buffer at the relay [11]. Since received packets can be stored
into the buffer, the relay can dynamically switch between
the source-relay and the relay-destination channels (under the
HD mode), and thus, the system secrecy performance can be
significantly increased.
On the other hand, when multiple relays are available, the
best scheme is beamforming [12]. In this scheme, multiple
relays perform beamforming to cancel the confidential in-
formation at the eavesdropper. Particularly, the zero-forcing
technique is incorporated with the max-min fair beamforming
approach to derive the beamforming weighting factors. If the
channel state information (CSI) of all links including the wire-
tap channels is available, completely nulling out confidential
signals at the eavesdropper can be obtained. Although the
beamforming scheme can provide a very promising secrecy
performance, its deployment complexity is high due to the
requirement of CSI of the wiretap channels and the difficulties
related to designing the weighting factors. Alternatives to the
beamforming scheme are RS schems, which include Max-
4Fig. 2. An illustration of the FDJ scheme, the FD capability of the relay is
exploited to transmit jamming signals toward the eavesdropper.
Min FD RS (MM-FD-RS), optimal FD RS (O-FD-RS), and
hybrid HD-FD RS (H-HD-FD-RS) schemes [13], [10]. In
the MM-FD-RS/O-FD-RS scheme, all the relays operate in
the FD mode and the relay that maximizes the conventional
capacity/SC is selected. In addition, in the H-HD-FD-RS
scheme, each relay first selects its best relaying mode, i.e.
HD or FD, and then the relay that maximizes the system SC is
chosen. It is shown that the H-HD-FD-RS scheme outperforms
the O-FD-RS counterpart, which is also superior to the MM-
FD-RS scheme. However, it should be noted that the MM-
FD-RS scheme is the simplest one since it does not require
CSI of the wiretap channels which is quite challenging to be
obtained in reality.
B. Relaying and Jamming Schemes
Different from the aforementioned schemes, the authors
of [9] propose the FDJ scheme in which a relay plays the
role of an actual relay or a friendly jammer one after the
other, as illustrated in Fig. 2. In particular, in this scheme,
each transmission takes place in two consecutive phases. In
the first phase, while receiving the source information, the
relay simultaneously transmits jamming signals to confuse the
eavesdropper. In addition, in the second phase, while the relay
forwards the confidential information to the destination, the
source emits jamming signals to jam the eavesdropper. We can
see that the eavesdropper always receives data from one node
and intended jamming signals from another node. It is shown
that when the target secrecy rate is small, the FDJ scheme
outperforms the FDR counterpart. However, when the target
secrecy rate becomes larger, the converse holds.
When the FD relay can be equipped with multiple receive
and transmit antennas, the authors of [14] propose the hy-
brid beamforming scheme, in which the relay simultaneously
transmits information to the destination and artificial noise
to the eavesdropper. The information and the artificial noise
beamforming vectors are designed to minimize the relay’s
transmit power while guaranteeing the system secrecy perfor-
mance. The proposed scheme is also able to mitigate the LI in
the spatial domain, and thus, digital interference cancellation
circuits can be omitted. However, equipping multiple antennas
at a relay node is not always feasible due to size, cost, or
hardware limitations. In addition, the scheme incurs a high
computation complexity, which limit its applications.
C. Secrecy Performance Comparison
In this subsection, we shall present comparisons of the
secrecy performance of the aforementioned K-PLS schemes
with single relay and with multiple relays, respectively. The
SOPs of the existing K-PLS schemes with single relay versus
the average SNR of the residual LI channel γrr are illustrated
in the Fig. 3, shown at the top of the next page. Thereby, the
average SNRs of the source-relay, relay-destination, source-
eavesdropper, and the relay-eavesdropper are set to be 40,
40, 10, and 10 dB. The independent Rayleigh fading is also
assumed. As expected, the FDR scheme outperforms the HD
counterpart when the residual LI is small, however, the con-
verse holds otherwise. In addition, it is shown that the secrecy
performance of the H-HD-FD scheme converges to that of the
FDR and HDR schemes in the low and the high region of
γrr, respectively. And in the medium range of γrr the H-HD-
FD scheme provides a better secrecy performance than that
given by the FDR and the HDR counterparts. Moreover, it is
observed that the FDJ scheme has a better secrecy performance
than that of the FDR scheme when the target secrecy rate
R0 = 1. However, the FDJ is inferior to the FDR counterpart
when R0 = 2. The reason is that the data transmission
in the FDJ scheme is operated following the HD manner.
Consequently, there is a factor of 1/2 in the secrecy capacity
of the FDJ scheme which deteriorates the system secrecy
performance. When R0 is small, the effect of the intended
jamming signals is larger than that of the 1/2 factor, and thus,
the FDJ scheme gives a better secrecy performance than that
provided by the FDR scheme. However, when R0 becomes
higher, the effect of the 1/2 factor goes up and becomes
dominant. Consequently, the converse happens. Lastly, the
results presented in the Fig. 3 suggest that combining the
H-HD-FD and the FDJ schemes is a promising solution to
enhance the secrecy performance of FD cooperative systems
in the low regions of γrr and R0.
We present the SOPs of the O-FD-RS, MM-FD-RS, H-
HD-FD-RS, and the beamforming schemes versus γrr in the
Fig. 4, shown at the top of the next page. For a comparison
purpose, the SOPs of the optimal HD RS and the naive random
FD RS schemes are also plotted. In the optimal HD RS
scheme, all relays operate in the HD mode and the relay
maximizing the system SC will be selected. In addition, in
the random FD RS scheme, all relays deploy the FD mode
and the active relay is randomly chosen. Here, the simulation
settings are as follows: the number of relays is 4 and the
average SNRs of the source-relay, relay-destination, source-
eavesdropper, and the relay-eavesdropper are set to be 30,
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Fig. 3. SOPs of the existing K-PLS schemes with a single relay, γsr =
γrd = 40 dB and γse = γre = 10 dB.
30, 10, 10 dB, respectively. In addition, for the beamforming
scheme, the inter-relay interferences are not considered since
the relays can be far away located, and thus, the inter-relay
interferences can be canceled much easier than the LI. It is first
shown that the random FD RS scheme gives the worst SOP
over the whole range of γrr, while the beamforming scheme
provides the best secrecy performance in the low region of
γrr. On the other hand, the optimal HD RS and the H-HD-
FD-RS schemes produce the best secrecy performance in the
high region of γrr. This fact is understandable because the
schemes solely based on the FD mode only work well when
the residual LI is weak, while the optimal HD RS and the
H-HD-FD-RS schemes are based on the HD mode which are
well-known to be superior to the FD counterpart when the
residual LI is strong. Secondly, the figure also shows that the
MM-FD-RS scheme gives a comparable secrecy performance
with that of the O-FD-RS scheme, which possesses a much
higher deployment complexity due to the requirement of CSI
of the eavesdropping channels. Thirdly, the results given in
the Fig. 4 recommend that in the high region of γrr, the
optimal HD RS scheme should be used. In addition, in the
low region of γrr, although the O-FD-RS, H-HD-FD-RS, and
the beamforming schemes provide excellent SOPs, they incur
high complexity, and thus the MM-FD-RS scheme turns out
to be a good alternative. In summary, replacing the O-FD-
RS criterion in the H-HD-FD-RS scheme by the MM-FD-RS
criterion to generate a novel modified H-HD-FD-RS scheme
is a low cost yet promising solution to guarantee the system
secrecy performance.
IV. A CASE OF STUDY: A SOURCE-BASED JAMMING
SCHEME FOR A SYSTEM WITH AN UNTRUSTED FD RELAY
We observe that all aforementioned works only focus on
trusted FD relays, while ignoring the scenarios with un-
trustworthy relays. The issue of untrusted relays arises in
systems in which nodes have different level of authority. For
example, in ad-hoc systems, relays are needed for connectivity;
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Fig. 5. A wireless cooperative system with an untrusted full-duplex relay.
however, they can be unauthenticated. As an another example,
in government or financial institution systems, relays may have
a lower security clearance than that of the source-destination
pair. In such systems, relays assist the source-destination
communication, yet they simultaneously try to eavesdrop
confidential information. Although cooperative systems with
untrusted FD relays are practical, they have not been inves-
tigated yet. Motivated by this observation, we now consider
a cooperative system with an untrusted FD relay, which is
graphical illustrated in the Fig. 5. Particularly, the considered
system consists of a single-antenna source S, a single-antenna
destination D, and an untrusted FD relay R. The relay has
two antennas used for reception and transmission, respectively.
In addition, R employs the AnF relaying protocol which is
obviously more preferable than the DnF counterpart under
untrusted relay’s scenarios.
It can be readily verified that the capacity obtained at D
is always less than or equal to that obtained at R. In other
words, the system secrecy capacity is always zero, and thus,
secure data transmission cannot be achieved. To enhance the
system’s secrecy performance, we propose to use a source-
based jamming (SBJ) scheme, in which the source uses a
fraction of its power to emit jamming signal to degrade the
relay’s interception. More specifically, at a time instant t, S
transmits a composite signal containing the confidential signal
xs with power αPs and the jamming signal xj with power
(1− α)Ps to R, where Ps and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 denote the source’s
transmit power and the power allocation ratio between xs
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and xj . The relay, while receiving the source’s information,
transmits an amplified version of of its received signal at a
time instant t − τ to D, where τ is the relay’s processing
delay. Without lost of generality, we model xj as an artificial
Gaussian noise. In addition, we assume that D has a full
knowledge of xj and global CSI. The first assumption can be
achieved by using pseudo-random or chaotic sequences which
are known to both S and D, yet not open to R. The second
assumption can be readily satisfied through the CSI exchange
procedure before data transmission. With the aforementioned
assumptions, D can perform interference cancellation before
decoding the desired signal. The SINRs at R and D (after
interference cancellation) are given as follows
γR =
αγsr
(1− α) γsr + γrr + 1
, (1)
γD =
αγsrγrd
γrdγrr(αγsr+1)
γsr+1
+ γsr + γrd + γrr + 1
, (2)
where γsr = Ps|hsr|
2
/N0, γrd = Pr |hrd|
2
/N0, γrr =
Pr|hrr|
2/N0, Pr is the relay’s transmit power, and hsr, hrd,
and hrr denote the channel coefficients of the S−R, R−D,
and the loop-interference channels, respectively. Noting that
by setting α = 1 in equations (1) and (2) we will obtain
the SINRs at R and D with the conventional FDR scheme
(without SBJ).
We now present several representative simulation results
to illustrate the characteristics of the proposed SBJ scheme.
In the simulation, all the wireless channels are modeled as
flat Rayleigh fading. In Fig. 6, we simulate the system SOP
versus γrr for the conventional FDR and the SBJ schemes
with several values of γsr, γrd, and α = 0.5. It is first shown
that the SBJ scheme significantly outperforms the conventional
FDR counterpart, whose SOP is always one. Secondly, for the
SBJ scheme, decreasing the value of γsr or γrd increases the
SOP since the received SINR at D is upper bounded by the
SINR of the weakest link. In addition, from the two middle
curves, we observe that the SOP of the case γsr = 20 dB and
γrd = 40 dB converges to one much faster than that of the
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Fig. 7. Secrecy outage probability versus α of the SBJ scheme with several
values of γrr and with γsr = γrd = 40 dB.
case γsr = 40 dB and γrd = 20 dB. It means that the S −R
channel has a greater impact on the SOP than the R − D
counterpart.
Figure 7 illustrates the SOP of the SBJ scheme versus
the power allocation ratio α. The figure shows that as γrr
increases, the SOP is enlarged. The reason is that the relay’s
LI is amplified and forwarded to the destination, and thus,
the relay’s LI would have a greater destructive impact on
the received SINR obtained at D than that obtained at R.
In addition, it is seen that as γrr is much smaller than γsr
and γrd, i.e. γrr = −10 and 0 dB, it is optimal to equally
allocate the power Ps to the confidential and the jamming
signals. Moreover, as γrr increases, the optimal values of α
deviates from 0.5 and tends to values that are close to zero. The
explanation is as follows. As shown in the Fig. 6, when γrr
increases, the SOP of the SBJ scheme tends to one. It means
that the SINR obtained at D approaches to that obtained at
R. Therefore, to enhance the system secrecy performance, we
will need to allocate more power to the jamming signal xj to
confuse the relay, and thus, reduces the relay’s capacity.
V. CHALLENGES AND RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES
The scope of future research on this topic is broad, and we
surely believe that novel cooperative scenarios and security
schemes shall soon be proposed and developed. We now
outline only a few interesting and challenging problems that
are worth further consideration. First, the robustness of the ex-
isting K-PLS schemes to inexact CSI need to be investigated.
It is obvious that the secrecy performance of the existing K-
PLS schemes depends heavily on CSI. In reality, CSI should
be first estimated and then fed back to a requesting node.
However, due to estimation error and feedback delay, only
imperfect CSI is available, which will definitely affect the K-
PLS schemes’ performance. Although CSI is a crucial factor
for the K-PLS schemes, the effects of imperfect CSI on their
secrecy performance have not been tackled yet.
Secondly, it is noted that all of the existing works focus
only on trusted FD relays, but have ignored scenarios with
7untrustworthy FD relays. When relays are unstrusted, they are
helpers and eavesdroppers simultaneously. To fully understand
the true benefits of FD relays in enhancing security, cooper-
ative systems with untrusted FD relays should be taken into
account. For these systems, closed-form analytic expressions
of the secrecy performance would be necessary to quickly
predict the systems’ behaviors in various environments and
reveal possible novel insights about the effects of key pa-
rameters on the systems’ behaviors, from which effectively
parameters’ tuning can be carried out. In addition, proposing
an efficient power allocation scheme that can maximize the
systems’ secrecy performance under total or the individual
power constraints is also a promising issue.
Thirdly, besides studying cases with all trusted or untrusted
FD relays, considering heterogeneous FD systems, which
consist of both trusted and untrusted relays, is also important.
The reason is that heterogeneous systems would commonly
exist in reality, i.e. in a sensor system, only a few relays
are compromised and become adversaries, while the rest of
relays remain trusted. For such systems, existing analytic
performance results may not hold. In addition, existing K-PLS
schemes may perform badly. Therefore, considering heteroge-
neous systems, deriving systems’ secrecy performance, and
proposing novel K-PLS schemes are necessary.
Fourthly, it is critical to search for new PLS techniques
that can help cooperative systems defense against smart ad-
versaries. A smart adversary can adaptively switch between
eavesdropping and jamming based upon the quality of the
wiretap channels. Particularly, if the wiretap channels are not
good, eavesdropping may not work well, and thus, the smart
adversary can instead send jamming signals to more efficiently
disrupt ongoing communications [1]. Under these scenarios,
we should take into account both CSI of the interference links
spanning from the adversary to the legitimate receiver and CSI
of the wiretap channels during our design process.
Last but not the least, it is well-known that PLS can
operate independent of higher layers so that it can be used to
augment existing cryptographic schemes. However, up to now,
research works that jointly consider PLS and cryptography
have not been reported yet. In other words, cross-layer security
approaches have not yet explored. Such cross-layer security
approaches are expected to further improve the security level
of cooperative systems at a lower cost as compared to con-
ventional security mechanisms. Hence, designing cross-layer
security schemes for cooperative systems is also an interesting
problem.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we first presented a contemporary summary
on K-PLS schemes proposed for wireless cooperative systems
with FD relays. The focus was on schemes with both single
and multiple relays to illustrate that FD relays can also be
exploited to improve the secrecy performance of coopera-
tive systems. By comparing the SOP of the existing K-PLS
schemes, we observed that for single relay systems, the H-
HD-FD scheme can be combined with the FDJ scheme to
further enhance the systems’ security in the low region of
the residual LI. In addition, for systems with multiple relays,
the Max-Min FD RS criterion, instead of the optimal FD RS
counterpart, can be used in the H-HD-FD RS scheme to con-
siderably reduce the systems’ complexity without sacrificing
much secrecy performance. Moreover, to improve the secrecy
performance of a cooperative system with an untrusted FD
relay, we proposed the SBJ scheme in which a source uses
a fraction of its power to transmit jamming signal to confuse
the untrustworthy relay. Finally, we provided an informative
discussion on possible interesting, yet challenging, research
problems that are worth further investigation.
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